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LABOR STANDARDS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS* 
 
 
Robert M. Stern 
University of Michigan 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
  The interaction of labor standards and international trade has become a key issue in the relations 
between the advanced industrialized and developing countries in the past decade.  Labor interests and social 
activists in the United States and other industrialized countries have argued that “unfair” labor practices and 
conditions exist in developing country trading partners and need to be offset by appropriate trade policy 
measures in order to “level the playing field.”  The concern is that the increased imports from countries in 
which labor standards are ostensibly not enforced at a sufficiently high level will be detrimental to wages 
and working conditions in the industrialized importing countries.  It is also argued that workers in 
developing countries are subject to exploitative and abusive working conditions, and that their wages are 
suppressed. 
  As will be noted in the discussion to follow, there is a wide disparity of views on issues of 
international labor standards.  In this paper, I explore these different views and the available options for 
addressing the issues involved.  The paper is structured as follows.  Section II deals with the definition and 
scope of labor standards. Theoretical aspects of the economic effects of labor standards are considered in 
Section III, while Section IV summarizes the empirical evidence.  Global, regional, national/unilateral, and 
other arrangements for the monitoring and enforcement of labor standards are discussed in Section V.  
Conclusions and implications for policy are presented in Section VI. 
                                                                        
*One of my greatest pleasures in life was my close association with Elliot Berg for nearly four decades, as his academic 
colleague at the University of Michigan and during the subsequent years that he spent in Washington, D.C.  Elliot was 
always generous with his time, and we shared many ideas over the years in each other’s research and writings.  I particu-
larly valued his comments and suggestions on my previous work dealing issues of trade and labor standards.  In writing 
this paper, I have received helpful comments from Lindsay Benstead and Andrew Brown.   2
II.  Definition and Scope of Labor Standards 
  Labor standards are multi-faceted and may vary from country to country depending on the stage of 
development, per capita income, and political, social, and cultural conditions and institutions.  It may be 
difficult therefore to distinguish unambiguously between universally agreed labor standards and those 
standards that depend on national circumstances.  Nonetheless, efforts have been made to identify and 
achieve consensus on a group of so-called core labor standards that ideally should apply universally.  For 
example, according to OECD (1996, p. 26), core labor standards include:  (1) prohibition of forced labor; 
(2) freedom of association; (3) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (4) elimination of child labor 
exploitation; and (5) nondiscrimination in employment.   
  Agreement on the universality of these core labor standards derives ostensibly from adoption of the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, acceptance (though not necessarily 
ratification) of the pertinent Conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO) that deal with 
human rights and labor standards, and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
in 1998.
1  Besides the aforementioned core standards, there are other labor standards that are less 
universally accepted, and that relate to “acceptable conditions of work,” which include:  a minimum wage; 
limitations on hours of work; and occupational safety and health in the workplace.
2 
  Some of the difficulties that may arise in interpreting and implementing core standards and 
distinguishing between core and other standards can be illustrated in the attempt by Fields (1995, p. 13) to 
articulate what he considers to be:   
  ...a set of basic labour rights for workers throughout the world: 
i) No person has the right to enslave another or to cause another to enter into indentured 
servitude, and every person has the right to freedom from such conditions. 
                                                                        
1 According to OECD (2000, p. 20), there are eight fundamental ILO Conventions that form the basis of consensus 
among the ILO’s constituents.  These include:  prohibition of forced labour (No. 29 and 105); freedom of association 
and protection of the right to organize and collective bargaining (No. 87 and 98); equal remuneration for men and 
women for work of equal value (No. 100); nondiscrimination in employment and occupation (No. 111); and minimum 
age of employment of children and abolition of the worst forms of child labor (No. 138 and 182). 
2 See Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1996, Appendix Table 1) for the definitions and principles of the core and other 
labor standards that are articulated in U.S. trade law, based on Lyle (1991, pp. 20-31).   3
ii) No person has the right to expose another to unsafe or unhealthy working conditions 
without the fullest possible information. 
iii) Children have the right not to work long hours whenever their families' financial 
circumstances allow. 
iv) Every person has the right to freedom of association in the workplace and the right to 
organise and bargain collectively with employers. 
It would be no easy matter to make operational Fields’ proposed basic worker rights.  For example, it is 
unclear how to interpret what is meant by “the fullest possible information” about working conditions or 
“families’ financial circumstances” in the case of child labor.  Further, countries may differ in the extent to 
which labor unions and collective bargaining are guaranteed as an absolute right. 
  To illustrate further, Aggarwal (1995, pp. 4-5) has proposed that a distinction be drawn between 
standards related to labor processes and standards related to labor outcomes.  This distinction would apply 
some definition of what constitutes a “minimum” standard to the determination of basic worker rights in 
terms of labor processes.  Presumably, the point of taking labor processes, rather than outcomes, into 
account is to make allowance for differences and changes over time in the level of economic development 
and related factors.  What remains ambiguous, however, as Aggarwal acknowledges, is the difficulty of 
deciding whether the identification and guarantee of labor processes lead to the improvement of labor 
outcomes. 
  The foregoing discussion is by no means intended to deny the desirability of improving working 
conditions through higher labor standards.  The issue, rather, is how this can best be accomplished.  Before 
discussing existing institutions and mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of labor standards, it may 
be useful first to consider the central theoretical issues and empirical evidence involved in analyzing their  
effects. 
III.  Economic Effects of Labor Standards:  Theoretical Considerations 
  Two main issues are to be considered in what follows:  (1) the diversity of labor standards and the 
case for free trade and (2) the effects of standards and the international harmonization of standards on the   4
economic welfare of individual nations.  Also to be considered are whether labor standards constitute 
private or public goods and issues of political economy associated with enforcing standards. 
Diversity of Standards and the Case for Free Trade 
  As noted in the preceding discussion, labor standards may vary across nations depending on their 
level of development, per capita incomes, and a host of political, social, and cultural conditions and 
institutions.  The issue is whether such diversity of standards alters the case for free trade.  Srinivasan (1995, 
1996) has investigated this issue theoretically.  He concluded that the diversity of labor standards between 
nations will reflect differences in factor endowments and levels of income, and that such diversity is 
consistent with the case for free trade.  He noted further that  if minimum international labor standards are to 
be attained, it will be necessary to have arrangements for international income transfers and domestic 
tax/subsidies.  This will be the case as well when consumers in countries with high standards have a moral 
preference to raise standards in their trading-partner countries with lower standards.  Further, if there are 
market failures that prevent the attainment of minimum labor standards, income transfers and domestic 
tax/subsidies will be required to achieve optimal conditions for resource allocation and consumer welfare.
3  
Finally, the use of trade intervention could hinder the attainment of higher labor standards, and it may 
accordingly be in the collective interests of countries to cooperate in setting labor standards.  The 
implications of Srinivasan's conclusions will be examined below in considering the different options for 
dealing with international differences in labor standards. 
International Harmonization of Labor Standards 
  Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1996) have analyzed the effects of labor standards on economic 
welfare and do not concern themselves directly with issues of the diversity of standards and the case for free 
trade.  They concluded that economic welfare is best served when countries act on their own to correct their 
domestic (labor) market failures.  But, since these market failures will likely differ between countries, there 
                                                                        
3 Srinivasan points out that the case for promoting labor unions and collective bargaining, which is considered to be a 
core labor standard, is by no means obvious in many developing countries, especially where unions are concentrated in 
the organized manufacturing and public sectors rather than in agriculture where a relatively large proportion of the   5
is no obvious case on welfare grounds for pursuing universal standards and the international harmonization 
of standards that this may imply.  This conclusion is consistent with that of Srinivasan, namely that diversity 
of working conditions between nations is the norm and is by no means in itself “unfair” so long as the extant 
labor standards are consistent with efficient resource use.
4  Further, despite the good intentions of 
government, it may turn out that the imposition of labor standards will not correct a market failure if the 
preferences of workers differ with respect to what they consider to be acceptable levels of, say, health and 
safety conditions in the workplace. 
  Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (BDS) further assessed arguments for having standards imposed on 
low-income countries.  They noted that low-income countries might conceivably benefit in case a 
government is unable for domestic political reasons to enact legislation on its own, although this presumes 
that the policy in question will indeed correct a market failure.  It is also possible that requiring the 
guarantee of such standards as the right of workers to organize may serve to reinforce development of 
democratic institutions.  Finally, they asked if there is any justification for high-income countries to take 
countervailing actions against the ostensibly unfair labor standards of their trading partners.  They answer in 
the negative so long as resources are being employed efficiently.  If, nonetheless, a high-income country 
imposes a tariff or quota on labor-intensive imports from a low-income country, this will obviously be 
harmful to the economic interests of workers in the low-income country.  In general then, BDS concluded 
that the case for international harmonization of labor standards appears rather weak, and it is quite possible 
that harmonization could have unintended adverse consequences for the very people who are in the greatest 
need for assistance.  It is difficult therefore to generate much theoretical support for pursuit of core labor 
standards that would have universal application. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
population may be employed. 
4 An exception arises here in cases of slave labor and what may be considered to be egregious treatment of child labor.   6
Labor Standards as Private/Public Goods 
  As already indicated, there may be a moral basis motivating the pursuit of higher labor standards.
5  
Thus, in his analysis noted above, Srinivasan made allowance for moral considerations so that consumers 
could express their concern by a willingness to pay relatively higher prices for goods and services that 
reflected higher labor standards.  In this connection, there is an issue of whether labor standards are to be 
considered as public or private goods.  As long as the same standards are shared generally for all consumers, 
the standards are public goods.  But individual consumers may have a sense of virtuousness and derive 
pleasure from believing that the good they are consuming embodies some acceptably high level of labor 
standards.  If individual consumers care only about their own satisfaction and not about others, labor 
standards can be treated as private goods. 
  This view of higher standards as private goods has been stressed by Freeman (1994), who argues 
that a market solution based on labeling may be an especially effective way to raise labor standards 
internationally.  He makes the point that labeling has the advantage that consumers pay more for what they 
consider morally acceptable, and at the same time foreign suppliers are compensated for their increased 
costs.  Labeling may also undercut protectionist influences.
6  It is not altogether clear, however, that labor 
standards should be considered to be private goods that lend themselves to a market-based treatment 
dependent on supplying all relevant information to consumers.  If instead, labor standards take the form of 
public goods, Freeman (p. 30) acknowledges that some type of government intervention may be called for.
7   
                                                                        
5 Granting this, it is nevertheless important to stress that concern about labor standards ought to be motivated by improv-
ing the welfare of workers in the developing countries, and not the workers with whom they compete in the advanced 
industrialized countries.  It is this latter view that motivates many of the advocates of labor standards.  What these 
advocates may not realize or acknowledge is that taking actions against alleged violators of labor standards will nor-
mally make the “exploited” workers worse off, not better off.  That will be true whether the sanctions are applied by 
government policy or by individual consumers responding to labeling.  Therefore, if we wish to make workers and their 
families better off, we must find a way to raise their incomes, not take their incomes away. 
6 But, as just noted, labeling does not in itself raise the incomes of foreign workers and their families. 
7 Freeman's argument for consumer labeling may therefore be limited insofar as it rests on treating labor standards as 
private goods.  He does not make clear, moreover, what role, if any, the government should play in providing informa-
tion to consumers and in facilitating labeling and preventing private labeling arrangements from being co-opted by 
producing interests.   7
Political Economy Aspects of International Labor Standards 
  In discussing the sources of support for governmental action on labor standards, it is important to 
identify the constituent interest groups involved.  Thus, in the United States for example, it would appear 
that organized labor, import-competing firms, and human rights and public-interest groups are the main 
proponents of stricter labor standards applied to developing countries.  These interest groups may often 
recommend policies, including sanctions and import restrictions, which are presumably designed to change 
the behavior of trading-partner governments.  By the same token, interest groups are influential in many 
developing countries, especially among unionized workers in manufacturing sectors, employees of state 
enterprises, and owners/managers of import-competing firms.  These groups may seek to protect and 
enhance their own ends and to resist foreign intrusion in setting standards.  Krueger (1997, p. 283) 
characterizes the protectionist motivation as the “prevailing political economy view of international labor 
standards.”
8  The issue then is how governments choose to respond to the various interest groups.  This will 
be addressed in Section V below. 
IV.  Economic Effects of Labor Standards:  Empirical Evi-
dence 
  In this section, we consider the empirical evidence on the effects of labor standards on wages and 
trade, foreign direct investment, and the role of interest groups. 
Labor Standards, Wages, and Trade 
  In the earlier discussion, “core” and “other” labor standards were distinguished.  The question then 
is the extent to which international differences in the various standards affect wages and trade performance. 
Brown (2000) has surveyed the relevant empirical evidence on wages and trade in the industrialized 
countries.  First, with respect to the recent experience of the trade of the industrialized countries with the 
developing countries, she stated (p. 16) that:  “…the impact on wages and unemployment in industrialized 
countries is difficult to gauge.”  Nonetheless, she noted that there is a preponderance of evidence 
                                                                        
8 While Krueger’s characterization may apply to unions and import-competing firms, it may not apply to the activities of 
human-rights and public-interest groups that are not motivated by protectionist considerations.   8
suggesting, for the United States at least, that trade was not the major reason for the observed widening of 
the skilled/unskilled wage differential.  This suggests that biased technical change rather than trade may 
have increased the demand for skilled workers, thus widening the U.S. wage gap.  This further suggests that, 
since imports from developing countries account for a relatively small proportion of total industrialized 
country imports, trade may more generally have a limited impact on the wages of unskilled workers in the 
industrialized countries. 
  Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2002) have reviewed the anecdotal and econometric evidence on the 
effects of multilateral production on wages in developing countries.  They concluded (p. 51) that:  
…there is virtually no careful and systematic evidence demonstrating that, as a generality, 
multinational firms [do not] provide incentives to worsen working conditions, pay lower 
wages than in alternative employment, or repress worker rights.  In fact, there is a large 
body of empirical evidence indicating that the opposite is the case. 
 
  Brown also reviewed the empirical studies of the effects of variations in labor standards across 
countries in determining the volume of trade, competitiveness, and comparative advantage.  She emphasized 
the importance of taking into account the empirical determinants of trade performance, not just labor 
standards, citing Rodrik (1996) as an exemplar.  What is noteworthy is that Rodrik found in his study that 
only the factor endowment (comparative advantage) variables were statistically significant and that none of 
the labor standard indicators were statistically significant.   
  Another study of interest is Aggarwal (1995), who investigated in detail the relationships of labor 
standards and the pattern of U.S. imports from ten major developing countries that accounted for 26.5 
percent of U.S. imports in 1994.  Her major findings (p. 7), as follows, further dissociate low labor 
standards with improved trade competitiveness: 
Sectors typically identified as having egregious labor conditions do not occupy the only or 
even the primary share of these countries' exports. 
Comparisons across more export-oriented and less export-oriented sectors indicate that core 
labor standards are often lower in less export-oriented or non-traded sectors such as 
agriculture and services. 
Similarly, within an export-oriented sector, labor conditions in firms more involved in 
exporting are either similar to or better than those in firms that are less involved in 
exporting.   9
Changes in technology and the structure of international trade are leading developing 
countries to compete in a race upward in terms of product quality rather than a race 
downward with respect to price. 
...Wages and working conditions in developing countries have been exhibiting positive 
trends.  In general, these have been in line with productivity changes. 
 
  Finally, some of the main conclusions from the OECD study of Trade, Employment and Labour 
Standards (1996, pp. 12-13) are worth citing:
9 
...empirical research suggests that there is no correlation at the  aggregate level between 
real-wage growth and the degree of observance of  freedom-of-association rights; 
...there is no evidence that low-standards’ countries enjoy a better  global export 
performance than high-standards’ countries; 
...a detailed analysis of US imports of textile products (for which  competition from low-
standards countries is thought to be most intense)  suggests that imports from high-
standards’ countries account for a large share of the US market.  Moreover, on average, the 
price of US imports of  textile products does not appear to be associated with the degree of 
enforcement of child labour standards in exporting countries…. 
  While the studies cited above may not constitute the final word, the conclusion seems inescapable 
that there is little compelling empirical evidence suggesting that low labor standards have a significant 
impact on wages and trade. 
Labor Standards and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
  It is often alleged that multinational enterprises may be attracted to locate in countries with lower 
labor standards to take advantage of lower costs.  The available empirical evidence actually indicates the 
opposite to be the case.  This is borne out, for example, in Rodrik (1996, p. 22), who concluded that low 
labor standards may be a hindrance, rather than an attraction, for foreign investors.  Aggarwal (1995, p. 7) 
reached a similar conclusion, as did the OECD (1996, p. 13).  Along these same lines, Brown, Deardorff, 
and Stern (2002, p. 51) concluded in their literature review that “…there is no solid evidence that countries 
with poorly protected labor rights attract FDI.”    
  Thus, the empirical evidence suggests rather convincingly that there is no basis for claiming that 
allegedly low labor standards in developing countries have a significantly adverse effect on wages in 
                                                                        
9 See also OECD (2000, esp. pp. 31-42) for further discussion and references.   10
industrialized countries, provide developing countries with an unfair advantage in their export trade, or 
distort the geographic distribution of FDI between low and high standards countries. 
Labor Standards and the Role of Interest Groups 
  As mentioned above, there is a common view that support for international labor standards reflects 
protectionist interests in the United States and other industrialized countries.  In an effort to test this 
proposition empirically, Krueger (1997) analyzed the determinants of sponsorship in the U.S. House of 
Representatives for the Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1995.  If approved, this legislation would have 
prohibited imports of goods produced abroad by child labor under specified circumstances, including by 
children under 15 years old and subject to a review of child labor practices by the U.S. Secretary of Labor.
10 
Krueger (p. 289) found that “...Congressmen from districts with a high concentration of high school 
dropouts are less likely to cosponsor the Child Labor Deterrence Act.  ...This finding is contrary to what I 
would expect from a simple political economy model....”   
  But Krueger also found that higher rates of unionization were associated with support for the Act as 
were representatives who were Democrats and also had voted against NAFTA and the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.  In interpreting his results, Krueger (p. 293) argued that unionized workers who tend to be 
more highly skilled and thus may not benefit directly from a ban on imported goods made with child labor 
may in this case be acting as a matter of principle to pursue policies that strengthen worker rights more 
generally rather than pursuing their own narrow self interest.  He went on more broadly to state (pp. 293-
94):  “Indeed, in many instances I am surprised that the AFL-CIO used its limited political capital to press 
for international labor standards that are of little benefit to its members, when instead it could pursue 
policies that are of much greater direct benefit to its membership.”  While Krueger’s results are suggestive, 
they are by no means definitive and have been questioned in particular by Srinivasan (1996, 1998) on the 
grounds that Krueger mismeasured the legislative sponsorship and the demographic characteristics of the 
labor constituencies of the U.S. Congressmen covered in his study. 
                                                                        
10 While this legislation never came to a vote,
 the U.S. 105
th Congress subsequently enacted the Bonded Child Labor   11
  The foregoing review of labor standards and trade strongly suggests, in this writer’s judgment, that 
the weight of the theoretical analysis and empirical evidence argues against taking an activist position to 
mandate and enforce international labor standards on developing countries.
11  Nonetheless, issues of labor 
standards continue to have a high profile in the current trade-policy environment.  It is essential accordingly 
to consider the alternative arrangements that exist for the monitoring and enforcement of labor standards..   
V.  Monitoring and Enforcement of Labor Standards 
  Labor standards are presently dealt with in a variety of settings:  global; regional; national/ 
unilateral; and other, including private, arrangements.  I shall discuss each of these in turn.
12 
Global Arrangements 
  The main international organization that is concerned with labor standards is the ILO, which was 
established as part of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 following the end of World War I.  The methods and 
principles set out in the ILO constitution deal with all conceivable aspects of labor standards.  As stated in 
ILO (1988, p. 4), ILO action designed to promote and safeguard worker rights takes three main forms:  (1) 
definition of rights, especially through adoption of ILO Conventions and Recommendations; (2) measures to 
secure the realization of rights, especially by means of international monitoring and supervision but not by 
imposition of trade sanctions; and (3) assistance in implementing measures, particularly through technical 
cooperation and advisory services.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Elimination Act, and it was signed by President Clinton on October 10, 1997.
 
11 There is evidently a marked difference in worldview between most advocates of international labor standards and 
trade and most other, particularly trade, economists.  Labor standards advocates seem to see the world in terms of a 
struggle between capital and labor for the rewards from production, without much regard to the size of the output that 
they will have to share.  They see the outcome as depending on power, not on economics.  Trade economists see the 
world in terms of how resources are allocated to production with a view to maximizing the total output.  They see the 
distribution of that output between capital and labor as depending on scarcity and productivity, not on power.  Therefore 
labor standards advocates favor the use of intervention to tilt the balance of power in favor of labor, believing then that 
labor will get a larger share of a fixed pie.  Trade economists see those same policies as shrinking the pie while altering 
the slices not by changing power but by changing the markets within which scarcity determines the rewards to capital 
and labor. 
12 Elliot and Freeman (2003) provide a comprehensive analysis of the issues that are discussed in what follows.  See also 
CUTS (2003) for a useful survey of the issues from the developing countries’ perspective.   12
  What might be considered to be ILO core labor standards was noted in Section II above.  It is 
interesting that formal ratification of the ILO Conventions on core labor standards differs considerably 
among ILO members, apparently because particular Conventions may be at variance with national laws and 
institutional practices.  Thus, for example, as noted in OECD (2000, pp. 22-23), the United States has 
ratified only two of the eight core labor standards Conventions, whereas several other industrialized and 
developing countries have ratified a significantly larger number.  Ratification of ILO Conventions may 
therefore not be an accurate indicator of existing national regulations governing labor standards, and there 
are many cases in which ratified Conventions are in fact not enforced.
13 
  It is interesting in this connection, as Charnovitz (1986, pp. 566-67) has noted, that issues of alleged 
unfair competition involving labor standards were addressed in Article 7 of Chapter II of the 1948 (still-
born) (Havana) Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO).  Since the GATT was conceived with 
a more narrow mandate as compared to the ITO, it did not address labor standards, except in Article XX(e) 
that provides for prohibition of goods made with prison labor.  Charnovitz (p. 574) notes further that as 
early as 1953 the United States proposed (unsuccessfully) adding a labor standards article to the GATT.  
This would have empowered GATT members to take measures against other countries under the provisions 
of GATT Article XXIII (Nullification and Impairment).  The United States continued, again unsuccessfully, 
to push for negotiation of a GATT article on labor standards in both the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the 1970s and 1980s.  But the international community was put on notice 
in April 1994 at the Marrakesh signing of the Uruguay Round accords that the United States intended to 
pursue issues of labor standards in future multilateral negotiations. 
  Subsequently, there were efforts at drafting a so-called social clause dealing with core labor 
standards and including trade sanctions for noncompliance that might eventually be incorporated into the 
WTO.  As noted in Aggarwal (1995, p. 38), in June 1994, the ILO began a research program dealing with 
the integration of social welfare and trade policy.  A central objective was to develop a stronger 
                                                                        
13 A detailed discussion of the observance of core labor standards in 75 selected countries is provided in OECD (1996, 
pp. 39-70) and OECD (2000, pp. 21-30).   13
enforcement mechanism.  The ILO Secretariat proposed that the ILO and WTO work jointly on the 
oversight of international core labor standards, with the ILO concentrating on international monitoring and 
the WTO responsible for enforcement by means of trade-related sanctions.  But because of disagreements 
among the country representatives of the ILO Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization 
of International Trade, it was decided in early 1995 to suspend further discussion of the use of trade 
sanctions for alleged noncompliance with core labor standards.  Instead, as noted in OECD (1996, p. 7), the 
ILO initiated a program of research on the effects of trade liberalization on core standards and a review of 
ILO means of action for the promotion of standards. 
  Nonetheless, the United States, with some support from European Union members, Canada, and 
Japan, continued to pursue the issue of trade and labor standards in the context of the WTO Singapore  
Ministerial Meeting in December 1996.  The Declaration issued following the Singapore Meeting 
acknowledged the importance of international labor standards.  But according to Williams (1996, p. 4), there 
was an apparent understanding that labor standards would remain the responsibility of the ILO.  However, 
this understanding was not accepted by the United States, which interpreted the Singapore Declaration as 
leaving the issue open.  The United States continued thereafter to press for inclusion of labor standards on 
the agenda of the Geneva 1998 WTO Ministerial Conference and was again denied.  The United States 
raised the issue of labor standards still again in December 1999 at the Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference. 
 At that time, President Clinton gave a speech and press interview in which he called for WTO trade 
sanctions in cases of violation of core labor standards.  The U.S. position provoked concerted opposition by 
the developing countries and together with such other divisive issues as agricultural protection and subsidies 
and antidumping policies, the Seattle Ministerial Conference was terminated without agreement on a 
negotiating agenda. 
  At the next WTO Ministerial Conference that was convened in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, it 
was agreed to launch a new multilateral trade round in January 2002 that was to be concluded by the end of 
2004.  Issues of labor standards were again acknowledged in the Doha Declaration, but the developing 
countries maintained their opposition to including labor standards as part of the negotiating agenda.  Thus,   14
labor standards are unlikely to be addressed multilaterally in the current Doha Round.  But, as we now 
discuss, labor standards are and will continue to be included in the regional and bilateral trade agreements 
negotiated by the United States especially and some other industrialized countries and in such other contexts 
as corporate codes of conduct and monitoring and labeling arrangements. 
Regional Arrangements 
European Union (EU) 
  Issues of worker rights have been a focus of attention in the EU because of concerns over low-wage 
competition from some EU member countries, persistent unemployment, and wage stagnation.  Sapir 
(1995b) noted that the first efforts to address the harmonization of social policies in Europe can be traced 
back to early stages of European integration prior to 1958.  According to De Boer and Winham (1993, p. 
17), the issue of a Community-wide Social Charter was first broached in 1972.  Subsequently, with the 
issuance in 1985 of the white paper signaling the intention to remove remaining barriers to trade and 
creation of a Single Market, a Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers was drafted in 
1988.  This Charter, which is quite comprehensive and encompasses the “core” and “other” labor standards 
noted in our earlier discussion,
14 has been adopted by all EU members.     
  In his evaluation of the EU Social Charter, Sapir (1995a, pp. 742-743; 1996) concluded that 
harmonization of social policies was not a pre-condition of successful European trade liberalization and 
integration.  He noted further that:  
…differences in labour standards between member states remain substantial and ‘social 
harmonisation’ remains a distant reality.  ...whatever harmonisation has been achieved in 
Europe, it could not have occurred without redistributive mechanisms between countries.  
In the absence of such mechanisms, the harmonisation of social policies cannot be 
contemplated internationally. 
 
Granted the foregoing, a perhaps more fundamental reason why EU social harmonization is not an 
appropriate model for the world economy is that the EU aspires ultimately to some form of political union. 
                                                                        
14 The highlights of the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights are summarized in De Boer and Winham (1993, pp. 36-
37), and the full text is to be found in Commission of the European Communities (1990).   15
NAFTA 
  At the time that the NAFTA was being negotiated, some observers urged that it should include a 
Social Charter for North America as a possible means of protecting the interests of workers.
15  Instead of 
including a Social Charter, however, and since the NAFTA had already been signed by the member 
countries in the summer of 1992, the newly elected Clinton Administration opted to pursue a separate side 
agreement covering labor and environmental issues.  At the time, the negotiation of these side agreements 
may have been helpful in obtaining Congressional approval for the NAFTA, especially in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. 
  Aggarwal (1995, p. 34) has summarized the main features of the labor side agreement as follows: 
First, the NAFTA supplemental agreement contains a more comprehensive list of labor 
standards than the five typically present in U.S. trade programs [which are noted below].  
The agreement commits each party to the promotion of eleven broad labor conditions 
ranging from freedom of association to migration policies.  Second, the agreement does not 
attempt to apply U.S. standards or...common uniform criteria in its evaluation of labor 
conditions in other countries.  Instead, the agreement contains different enforcement 
mechanisms for different standards.  The complaint process consists of three stages--filing 
a petition with the domestic National Administrative Office (NAO), Ministerial 
consultations, and lastly consultation with the Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE).  
Complaints pertaining to freedom of association, the right of collective bargaining, and/or 
the right to strike can only be taken to the second stage of the complaint process...[and] 
sanctions cannot be utilized to encourage enforcement of laws pertaining to these rights.  
Of the eleven labor principles, only the implementation of those pertaining to child labor, 
minimum employment standards, and occupational health and safety can be supported by 
sanctions.
16 
  According to the U.S. Department of Labor (2003b), as of April 13, 2003, 25 submissions have 
been filed under the NAFTA labor side agreement.  Sixteen were filed with the U.S. NAO, of which 14 
involved allegations against Mexico and 2 against Canada.  Thirteen of the 16 U.S. NAO submissions have 
involved issues of freedom of association.  Three submissions were withdrawn before hearings were held or 
the review process completed, four were declined for review, and hearings were held and public reports 
released on nine submissions.  Seven of the U.S. submissions have gone to ministerial level consultations. 
                                                                        
15 A useful reference is Lemco and Robson (1993). 
16 More complete details on the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation are provided in U.S. Department of   16
  The Mexican NAO filed six submissions against the United States.  Five submissions resulted in 
ministerial consultations and one submission is pending for consultations.  The Canadian NAO filed one 
submission against Mexico for which consultations are pending and two against the United States that have 
been declined. 
  The NAFTA side agreement on labor has thus involved a number of submissions especially by the 
United States regarding violations of labor standards aimed principally at Mexico.  As mentioned, the 
objective of the submissions has been to address the labor issues through a consultative process, and it is 
noteworthy that sanctions have not been used to enforce any of the labor rights at issue.  The side-agreement 
process might thus be viewed as a convenient political expedient to placate U.S. labor activists while at the 
same time avoiding confrontation with NAFTA partners over the use of trade sanctions.  It is interesting to 
note that this defusing of labor opposition has been carried over to the inclusion of the NAFTA labor 
provisions in the bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) that the United States has negotiated with Jordan 
(2001), Chile (2003), and Singapore (2003).
17  There is a presumption that future bilateral and regional 
FTAs that the United States is currently negotiating or planning will contain these same labor provisions.  
Thus, while the United States has been frustrated in including labor standards in the WTO multilateral 
negotiating agenda, it has actively pursued the inclusion of labor standards in its bilateral and regional trade 
agreements.  It is an interesting question accordingly whether at some future time this may open the door to 
including similar provisions in the WTO multilateral rules and procedures that could be coupled with trade 
sanctions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Labor (2003a). 
17  The texts of the provisions of the U.S. FTAs with Chile and Singapore are available on the USTR website 
[www.ustr.gov].  As in the NAFTA side agreement, the bilateral FTAs contain a provision for monetary penalties in the 
event that a party fails to conform to a ruling on a dispute settlement panel on a labor issue.  It may be noted that Canada 
had labor provisions and a procedure for permitting fines in the NAFTA side agreement and its FTA with Chile.  But in 
the recent Canadian FTA with Costa Rica, the administrative/institutional provisions are less strict, there is greater 
provision for technical cooperation, and no fines.  Canada is currently negotiating a FTA with four Central American 
countries, and the labor provisions will contain an even greater emphasis on cooperative programs.  The EU association 
agreements, as for example between the EU and Morocco (2000), contain language affirming the democratic principles 
and fundamental human rights established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but do not provide for sanc-
tions.  Japan’s FTA with Singapore and other FTAs in process do not contain explicit labor provisions.   17
National/Unilateral Arrangements 
  As noted in Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1996, p. 229), since the 1980s it has become increasingly 
common to include international labor standards criteria in U.S. foreign economic legislation.
18  The Trade 
Promotion Authority Act of 2002 contains labor clauses that establish U.S. negotiating objectives and 
criteria.  The 2002 Act includes renewal of the:  1971 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); the 1984 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act; the 2000 Caribbean Basin Trade and Partnership Act; and 
extension of the 1991 Andean Trade Preference Act.  There is also the 2000 African Growth and 
Opportunity Act.
19  Under U.S. legislation, countries can be removed from beneficiary status on 
submissions to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) by labor or non-governmental 
organizations or by the USTR itself.  GSP eligibility has in fact been revoked at times for a number of 
developing countries until they have shown evidence that the offending actions have been or are in the 
process of being eliminated.
20  It is noteworthy that the European Union (EU) also has a GSP program,
21 
which includes special incentive arrangements for additional tariff preferences for countries that comply 
with the eight ILO core labor standards noted in Section II above.
22  
                                                                        
18 The standards include: (1) the right of association; (2) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (3) freedom from 
forced labor; (4) a minimum age for employment of children; and (5) acceptable conditions of work, including a mini-
mum wage, limitations on hours of work, and occupational safety and health rights in the workplace. 
19 The United States has a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Cambodia that links special quotas for most 
Cambodian textile exports with improving worker rights in textile factories.  As noted in USTR (2002), this MOU was 
extended for an additional three years at the end of 2001 and runs through 2004.  The quota for 2002 was fifteen percent 
higher than in 2001 and can be increased further provided that Cambodia demonstrates “substantial compliance” with 
internationally recognized core labor standards.  It may be noted that when Vietnam was granted “normal trade rela-
tions” in the July 2000 U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, there were no provisions for labor rights.  It may be 
noted, further, that there are provisions for worker rights in the authorization for the U.S. Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) and in the bilateral investment treaties that the United States has signed with 34 countries.  As 
reported in U.S. Department of the Treasury (2003), the U.S. Treasury is directed to evaluate the recognition of workers 
rights and to promote such rights by borrowing member countries of the International Financial Institutions.  . 
20 The Worker Rights Case History under the U.S. GSP as of April 11, 2003 is documented and is available from the 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs.  Elliot and Freeman (2003, esp. Ch. 4) provide an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the U.S. GSP investigations and suspensions. 
21 See European Union (2003) for a user’s guide to the EU GSP. 
22 According to the World Trade Organization, WT/DS246/4, on December 6, 2002, India requested establishment of a 
dispute settlement panel to investigate whether the EU tariff preferences accorded under the special incentive arrange-
ments for the protection of labor rights and the environment may be inconsistent with Article 1.1 of the GATT.  Article 
1.1 requires that extension of any advantage or privilege for imports provided to any individual WTO member country 
be extended to all WTO member countries.  India also claims that the EU special preferences violate the GATT “ena-  18
  While there may be instances in which countries have improved their labor standards to maintain 
their U.S. GSP eligibility or qualify for EU special preferences, the issue is that the extension or removal of 
GSP eligibility is essentially decided unilaterally by the United States and the EU, both of which are 
obviously very powerful entities in the global trading system.  It might nonetheless be argued that the 
experiences with quid-pro-quo actions under the GSP programs can possibly provide some useful insights 
into the design and implementation of policies and procedures governing trade-linked labor standards in 
other contexts.  But the question remains that the GSP programs may offer only limited benefits to the 
developing countries involved because of the restricted product coverage and the administrative rules that 
are applied in determining rules of origin.
23 .  Also, in the future the value of GSP will be eroded by the 
tariff reductions previously negotiated in the Uruguay Round and those to be negotiated in the ongoing 
Doha Development Agenda round.  Developing countries might therefore be advised to be wary of entering 
into preferential arrangements that may not be in their national interests.
24 
Other Arrangements 
  There are a number of other arrangements that deserve mention in addition to those already 
discussed above.   
  For example, as noted in OECD (1996, pp. 161-69), the OECD, ILO, UNICEF, and other UN 
agencies have been active in promoting cooperative programs of economic development in which practical 
measures backed up often by multilateral and bilateral financial assistance can be devised to deal with some 
of the underlying causes of poverty in poor countries that may be reflected in the employment of children 
and the absence or relatively weak enforcement of core labor standards.  The OECD and ILO have also 
developed international codes of conduct applicable to multinational enterprises (MNEs) that may assist in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
bling clause” that calls for establishing nonreciprocal and nondiscriminatory preferences under GSP schemes and that 
preferences should foster the trade and other needs of developing countries.  See Howse (2003) for an analysis of India’s 
challenge in the WTO of the EU special preferences.  
23 See Brenton and Manchin (2003) for an assessment of the EU GSP. 
24 Srinivasan (1997) characterizes the GSP as “‘crumbs from the rich man’s table’ which the developing countries 
should do well without.”   19
improving labor standards and working conditions in MNE affiliates in host developing countries.  Individ-
ual firms can attempt to develop codes of conduct on their own, as Elliot and Freeman (2003) have noted 
and has been done by several U.S. MNEs and those of other countries. These cooperative efforts and codes 
of conduct are essentially voluntary in nature, and, of course, there is no guarantee that they will be effective 
in all circumstances in developing countries. Nonetheless, they serve an important role insofar as they help 
to focus attention on the importance of the root causes of underdevelopment and the types of business 
practices that may help developing countries to raise per capita incomes and improve conditions of work.
25 
  Finally worth mentioning is the use of consumer labeling in providing a market-based method for 
helping to improve labor standards when these standards can be treated as private goods.  The advantage of 
labeling is that it provides information about production processes being used and allows consumers in 
making their consumption choices to reflect the satisfaction that they derive from the presumed realization 
of higher labor standards internationally.
26  When labor standards are considered to be public goods, there 
will be a need for governmental policies.  What is important is that these various private and public actions 
can be carried out without the coercion that may be involved when efforts are made internationally to 
influence governments to change their domestic labor-market policies.
27 
                                                                        
25 See Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2002) for an elaboration of the case to be made for voluntary codes of conduct. 
26 Aggarwal (1995, pp. 39-40) cites the example of the Child Labor Coalition, which was formed in 1989 by several 
religious, human rights, and union groups for the purpose of informing consumers in high-income countries about child 
labor conditions used in producing goods such as rugs in South Asia.  The Coalition has sponsored the so-called Rug-
mark campaign that provides producers with a certifying label that they can attach to their exports indicating that they do 
not employ child labor.  It has been suggested that the Rugmark labeling system could be extended to clothing and other 
products.  In this connection, see U.S. Department of Labor (1996) for a report on codes of conduct for the U.S. apparel 
industry.  Voluntary codes of conduct in the apparel industry have become increasingly common since the early 1990s.  
A recent example is the U.S. Presidential task force agreement to “end” apparel sweatshops worldwide and give a seal of 
approval to companies that comply with the code of conduct.  The Fair Labor Association (FLA) was created to imple-
ment this code of conduct.  As reported in the June 10, 2003 Financial Times by Maitland (p. 8), the FLA audited nearly 
50 MNE factories globally in 2001-02 and reported a number of abuses that have been or are being corrected.  For 
further analysis of the design and objectives of the FLA and the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), both of which have 
been actively monitoring labor rights in developing countries on behalf of a large number of U.S. universities and 
colleges that sell MNE produced clothing bearing their academic logos, see Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2002). 
27 It should be noted, however, that in a “quiet maneuver” led by Representative Bernard Sanders, (Ind-VT) and Senator 
Tom Harkin (D-IA), the 105
th U.S. Congress enacted the Bonded Child Labor Elimination Act, and it was signed by 
President Clinton on October 10, 1997.  The Act is designed to prohibit imports of goods made by indentured child 
laborers, that is, children who are sold into bondage by their parents and who must work for an extended period of time 
to gain their freedom.  But it is not clear how this Act is being enforced, and it is unlikely in any case to effect significant 
improvement in the conditions of poverty that are characteristic of the families involved.    20
VI.  Conclusions and Implications for Policy 
  The motivation for this paper has been to consider whether international labor standards should be 
incorporated into trade agreements.  While an argument can be made for devising WTO rules and 
disciplines to improve core labor standards in developing countries, the feasibility of effective action is 
limited because of the diversity of labor standards in countries with differing national characteristics, 
policies, and institutions.
28  Furthermore, the theoretical and empirical literature summarized above suggests 
no compelling rationale for the international enforcement and harmonization of labor standards. 
  What then should be done on the global level?  The responsibility for addressing issues of 
international labor standards has historically been assigned to the ILO.  But the ILO has often been 
criticized because it lacks a mechanism for enforcement of discipline to raise labor standards and because at 
times it has espoused an interventionist social agenda.  While these criticisms may be valid, they miss the 
point in my judgment.  If one looks at the economic development of the United States, Western Europe, 
Japan and other advanced industrialized countries over the past century, it is evident that the real incomes of 
workers have increased dramatically and that the conditions of work have improved concomitantly.  To 
achieve these improvements in labor standards has required an active role for government together with 
broad public support in individual nations.  In recent decades, there have been similar improvements in a 
substantial number of developing countries, especially in East and Southeast Asia as well as in Latin 
America.  What the historical record suggests therefore is that it is not through the external enforcement of 
labor standards that improvements have been realized, but through internal economic and social 
development. 
  With sufficient encouragement and increased financial support, the ILO can provide a multilateral 
forum that would serve to strengthen its role and authority in pursuing improved labor standards 
internationally.  While the United States and some other industrialized countries have tried to link trade and 
                                                                        
28 See Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2001) for an analysis of the pros and cons of linking trade and labor standards in the 
WTO.  They argue against such linking because the sanctioning procedures involved in dealing with alleged violations 
of labor standards in developing countries may be dominated by protectionist interests in the United States and other 
developed countries.   21
labor standards in the WTO, their efforts have been unsuccessful. The challenge then is to reinforce the 
institutional role for which the ILO has been designed.
29 
  If the responsibility for monitoring and helping developing countries to improve their labor 
standards is centered in the ILO, there is no obvious case to be made for the United States and other 
industrialized countries to incorporate labor standards issues into their national and regional trade policies 
and trade agreements.  It has to be acknowledged nonetheless that adherence to certain specified labor 
standards has been made a condition in U.S. and EU preferential trade arrangements, including the GSP, the 
labor side agreement in the NAFTA and in bilateral U.S. FTAs, and in other U.S. legislation and programs.  
It has not been demonstrated, however, that these various arrangements have led to significant increases in 
the economic welfare of developing countries and improvement of their labor standards.  Indeed, the 
interests of developing countries might be better served if the financial and technical assistance provided by 
the United States and other industrialized countries were more effectively targeted to reduce poverty and if 
the industrialized countries dismantled their import barriers to encourage greater exports by developing 
countries.     
  In the final analysis, there is pervasive historical evidence suggesting that as developing countries 
achieve higher levels of per capita incomes and in the process institute pro-active social policies, conditions 
of work and workers’ rights can be significantly improved. 
                                                                        
29 In this connection, see Srinivasan (1995, 1997) and Brown (2001).       22
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